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Abstract 
To control the opportunistic behavior of a human being is a very difficult task. In agency theory, the principal 
delegates decision making to the agent. Delegating decision-making authority can lead to loss of efficiency and, 
consequently, increased costs. These costs are called agency costs. Sound corporate governance is essential to 
coordinate interests among all parties' relationship for sustainable development and growth of a company. The 
study is aimed at comparing corporate governance scenario in Bangladesh and three other countries and 
to identify the areas that need further improvement in order to ensure better governance, reliability, transparency, 
and accountability. This study is basically exploratory in nature. Strength areas of our corporate governance code 
are the specification of board size, restriction of no. of independent directorship, the shareholding of independent 
directors, and the quorum of the audit committee. But the major weakness areas are the non-specification of no. 
of committee act as member and Chairman by one person; lack of training of BOD; lack of evaluation of BOD, 
CEO and Independent directors; non-inclusion of employee participation, whistleblower policy, voting right, 
remuneration and Nomination Committee. These findings will help regulators in taking corrective actions for better 
performance and favorable treatment of all stakeholders. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, SAARC, Agency Theory 
 
1. Introduction: 
In agency theory, one party (the principal) delegates the decision making to another party (the agent) – this is 
referred to as an agency relationship. Delegating decision-making authority can lead to loss of efficiency and, 
consequently, increased costs. These costs are called agency costs. Under Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) is 
developed on the assumption that all individual action is driven by self-interest and that individuals will act as an 
opportunistic manner to increase their wealth. Organizations are considered as collections of self-interested 
individuals who have agreed to cooperate. Such cooperation does not mean that they have abandoned self-interest 
as an objective; rather it means only that they have entered into contracts that entail sufficient incentives to secure 
their cooperation (Deegan, 2009).To control the opportunistic behavior of a human being is a very difficult task. 
The self-love or personal self-interest, however, is not a bad thing so long as this does not hamper others’ legitimate 
interests. The problem is that in trying to maximize one’s own utility and satisfying own needs there are chances 
of frustrating others’ interests and needs. Therefore, there arises the need to identify potential areas where 
an individual or group tries to work for its self-interest at the cost of others. There also arises the need to devise 
control mechanisms in order to check or mitigate this opportunistic behavior (Chowdhury, 2004). Corporate 
Governance (CG) is mostly the most important control mechanism for the effective and efficient utilization of 
corporate resources. Keasey and Wright (1993)’s definition of CG appears to be similar to be the above, where 
it is concerned with structures and processes associated with production, decision making and control within an 
organization. The purpose of CG is to coordinate a conflict of interests among all parties' relationship within the 
company and to develop a system that can reduce or eliminate the agency problems (OECD, 1997). It argues that 
the agency problems become more critical with weak governance and limited protection of minority shareholders 
in a company (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000). It is the system used to govern a corporation so that the 
interest of corporate owners is protected. Better governance standard tend to have higher value (La Porta et al.1999) 
through monitoring management effectiveness and preventing improper irregular behavior (Turrent & Ariza, 2016), 
ensuring protection of shareholders’ right and investors’ confidence (La Porta et al. 2000), improving quality of 
board governance, increasing the accountability to minority shareholder, reducing monitoring cost by general 
investors (Biswas, 2012) and lowering cost of capital which are prerequisites for sustainable development and 
growth of our country to be middle income county in 2021 and developed country in 2041. CG covers the concepts, 
theories, and practices of boards and their directors and the relationship between boards and shareholders, top 
management, regulators and auditors and other stakeholders (Huq & Bhuiyan, 2012). The purpose of this study is 
to compare the CG component factors in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Srilanka. The purpose of 
choosing SAARC counties as it comprises 21% of the world population (Wikipedia). The study is aimed at 
comparing corporate governance scenario in Bangladesh and three other countries and to identify the areas that 
need further improvement in order to ensure better governance, reliability, transparency, and accountability. These 
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findings will help regulators in taking corrective actions for better performance and favorable treatment of all 
stakeholders. 
 
2. Literature Review: 
Owners are separated from management (agency theory); this agency relationship resulted in the asymmetry of 
information between owners and managers, this asymmetry, in turn, created the avenue for managers to shirk. CG 
can be seen as monitoring of management by shareholders, creditors, bankers, auditors and government 
(Chowdhury, 2004). Good corporate governance principles can make stronger intra-company control and reduce 
opportunistic behaviors and lower the asymmetry of information, so it will be a positive impact on an organization 
(Rouf et al. 2010). Much literature emerged in the 1990s focusing on the two most dominant corporate governance 
models, the Anglo-American model, and the German-Japanese model. The Anglo-American model is recognized 
as a “market based” system of corporate governance, and is distinguished both by the attributes of the prevailing 
legal and regulatory environment (Prowse, 1996), and is most common in the Anglo-American countries. The 
German-Japanese model or “bank-centered relationship-based model” of corporate governance is distinguished as 
“control-oriented” financing (Prowse 1996).  This model is common in Europe and East Asia, and uniquely 
emphasizes the long-term relationship between firms and investors. Bangladeshi context align with the German-
Japanese model, such as a concentration of shareholdings by the banks and financial institutions or dominant 
shareholders leading to a high degree of ownership control, a less liquid capital market, weak shareholders’ rights, 
a dominant agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders, and a limited capacity for boards of 
directors (Rashid et al., 2015). The Cadbury Report (Cadbury, 1992), titled Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance, defines corporate governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. As 
per the Cadbury report, corporate governance should encompass (but not limited) to the following aspects: 
Firstly, every public company should be headed by an effective board comprising of both executive directors 
and non-executive directors which can both lead and control the business. 
Secondly, Chairmen are primarily responsible for the working of the board, for its balance of membership 
subject to board and shareholders’ approval, for ensuring that all relevant issues are on the agenda, and for ensuring 
that all directors, executive, and non-executive alike, are enabled and encouraged to play their full part in its 
activities. 
Thirdly, the audit provides an external and objective check on the way in which the financial statements have 
been prepared and presented, and it is an essential part of the checks and balances required and 
Finally, the formal relationship between the shareholders and the board of directors is that the shareholders 
elect the directors, the directors’ report on their stewardship to the shareholders and the shareholders appoint the 
auditors to provide an external check on the directors’ financial statements. 
Another set of five good corporate governance principles is offered by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD, 1999). The five principles are: 
Rights of shareholders  
 
1. Recognition of basic shareholder rights 
2. Shareholders should be sufficiently informed about, and have the right to 
approve or participate in, decisions concerning fundamental corporate 
changes  
3. Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and vote 
in general shareholder meetings 
4. Shareholders, including institutional shareholders, should be allowed to 
consult with each other on issues concerning their basic shareholder rights 
5. Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient 
and transparent manner 
6. Shareholders should consider the costs and benefits of exercising their 
voting rights 
Equitable treatment of 
shareholders 
1. All shareholders of the same series of a class should be treated equally 
2. Insider trading and abusive self-dealing should be prohibited 
3. Board members and managers should disclose material interests 
Role of stakeholders 1. The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual 
agreements are to be respected. 
2. Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have 
the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
3. Permit performance-enhancing mechanisms for stakeholder participation  
4. Stakeholders should have access to relevant information in the corporate 
governance process 
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Disclosure and 
transparency 
1. The scope of material information to be disclosed  
2. Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high- 
quality standards of accounting and financial and non-financial reporting 
3. Annual audit be conducted by an independent auditor  
4. Fair, timely and cost-effective means of disseminating information 
Responsibilities of the 
board 
1. Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with 
due diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and the 
shareholders.  
2. The board should treat all shareholders fairly 
3.  The board should ensure compliance with the law and take account the 
interest of stakeholders  
4. Definition of key functions of the board  
5. The board should exercise objective judgment independent from 
management  
6. Board members should have access to accurate, relevant and timely 
information     
Source:  OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999). 
After falling of Enron, the U.S. Congress passed the most important reform of corporate governance in many 
decades— The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
A summary of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was obtained from the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) 
Firstly, the Act requires that both the CEO and CFO certify in writing that their company’s financial 
statements and accompanying disclosures fairly represent the results of operations with possible jail time if a CEO 
or CFO certify results that they know are false. 
Secondly, the Act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to provide additional 
oversight over the audit profession. 
Thirdly, the Act places the power to hire, compensate, and terminate the public accounting firm that audits a 
company’s financial reports in the hands of the audit committee of the board of directors. 
Fifth, the Act requires that a company’s annual report contain an internal control report and 
Finally, the Act establishes severe penalties of as many as 20 years in prison for altering or destroying any 
documents that may eventually be used in an official proceeding and as many as 10 years in prison for managers 
who retaliate against a so-called whistleblower who goes outside the chain of command to report misconduct. 
There is a dearth of comparative studies of corporate governance guidelines with developing countries like 
Bangladesh. Most studies are focused on developed countries. Mintz (2006) found that the U.S. and UK represent 
shareholder models of ownership and control whereas in Germany a stakeholder approach to corporate governance 
provides greater input for creditors, employees and other groups affected by corporate decision making. Qurashai 
(2017) found that Bahrain and Qatar maximum convergence with the CG good practices as recommended by the 
UN, Oman, and UAE the least convergence. Although some of the studies were trying to understand the extent of  
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (Rashid et al., 2009; Nath, Islam & Saha, 
2015; Haque & Arun, 2016; Rouf, 2011 and Das, 2017). Momtaz and Yusuf (2005) identified that poor bankruptcy 
laws, no push from the international investor community, limited or no disclosure regarding related party 
transactions, weak regulatory system, general meeting scenario, lack of shareholder active participation were major 
shortcomings of our code. Bhowmik and Islam  (2013)  found that the strengths of our code were specific condition 
to be appointed as independent director, specific time period to fill the vacancy of the member both Board of 
Director (BOD) and audit committee, specific qualifications to be independent director, the requirement of the 
compliance certificate and rules related with subsidiary company but weaknesses were lack specific instructions 
regarding number of board meeting, audit committee meeting, time gap between two meeting, shareholders' voting 
right, proxy right etc. considering different Asian countries namely Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, China, and 
Malaysia . Biswas (2012) found that CG code could be further improved by including provisions to ensure the true 
independence of the board and its committees, minimum educational and professional service requirements for 
non-independent directors, and annual assessments of the board members. Rahman & Khatun (2017) found that 
corporate governance guideline 2012 include some new issues such as criteria and qualification of independent 
director; some additional statements in the directors’ report; mandatory requirement of separation of chairman and 
CEO; constitution of audit committee; chairman of audit committee; role of audit committee, duties of CEO and 
CFO on financial statements; and collection of compliance certificate from professional accountant or secretary in 
compare to corporate governance guidelines 2016 also recommended for inclusion of more issues such as tax 
management and reporting, risk management and reporting; individual and overall performance analysis of the 
board and independent directors; separate nomination and compensation committee; assessment of true 
independence of the board and its supporting committees to ensure higher quality of corporate governance and 
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transparency. The objective of our study is to compare the corporate governance guidelines in SAARC and to 
identify potential areas for improvement. 
 
3. Methodology of the Study 
This study is basically exploratory in nature. The study is aimed at comparing corporate governance scenario in 
Bangladesh and three other countries and to identify the areas that need further improvement and develop best 
practices of the corporate governance in Bangladesh. We select India, Srilanka and Pakistan for comparison with 
our code as those countries are similar cultural, legal, social and economic environments. The data has been 
collected from secondary sources. The major source of secondary data include SEC guidelines of different 
countries including Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Srilanka, relevant books, publications, journals, periodicals, 
research paper, newspaper clippings, articles, and internet. 
 
4. Corporate Governance Guidelines in SAARC Region: 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is the regional intergovernmental organization and 
geopolitical union of nations in South Asia. Its member states include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
Nepal, Maldives, Pakistan and Srilanka. It was founded in Dhaka on 8th December 1985. In our study, we consider 
four countries including Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Srilanka. The reason for choosing these corporate 
governance guidelines is that the countries are regionally closer.  
As corporate governance is a multifaceted set of cultural, economic, and social issues and that the corporate 
governance guidelines of corporations differ from country to country, it is appropriate that corporate governance 
guidelines and practice codes be planned and adopted by each constituent country.  
In India, after establishing Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) on April, 1992, the Confederation 
of Indian Industry (CII) was prepared voluntary corporate governance code titled ‘Desirable Corporate 
Governance - A Code’. Consequently, in early 1999 SEBI had set up a committee under Kumar Mangalam Birla 
and it was the first formal and comprehensive attempt to evolve a code of corporate governance. In early 2000, the 
SEBI board accepted and rectified key recommendations of the Birla Committee. Naresh Chandra Committee 
appointed in August 2002 by the Department of Company Affairs (DCA) under the Ministry of Finance and 
Company Affairs to examine various corporate governance issues. The fourth initiative is in form the 
recommendations of the Narayana Murthy Committee. The ‘Corporate Governance -Voluntary Guidelines 2009’, 
being proposed for voluntary adoption by the Corporate Sector has taken into account the recommendations of the 
Task Force set up by Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) under the chairmanship of Shri Naresh Chandra in 
February 2009. Then ‘Corporate Governance -Voluntary Guidelines 2009’ was promulgated by the Ministry of 
Corporate Affairs, Government of India.  
In Pakistan, The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) was issued the Code of Corporate 
Governance in March 2002 which was later amended in 2012 and became applicable to all public listed companies. 
In Srilanka, The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Srilanka was the pioneer in initiating good corporate 
governance principles titled ‘Code of Best Practice on matters related to financial aspects of Corporate 
Governance’ in 1997, which was subsequently updated in 2003 and 2008.     
After taking into account the changes taking place all over the world a committee was appointed in 2011 to 
review and revise the Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance, issued in 2008. 
Finally  the updated publication of the Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance 2013, which was 
promulgated through the joint initiatives of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka. 
In Bangladesh, Corporate Governance guidelines emerged in 2006 based on suggested by the Taskforce on 
Corporate Governance (2004) convened and supported by Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) and amended in 
2012. SEC issued a notification on Corporate Governance Guidelines (CG Guidelines) for the publicly listed 
companies of Bangladesh under the power vested on the Commission by Section 2CC of the Securities and 
Exchange Ordinance, 1969. The regulatory authority further revised the corporate governance guidelines of 2016 
which were issued on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, providing some ‘breathing space’ for the companies to 
implement on the basis of their capabilities. 
 
  
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.10, No.26, 2018 
 
12 
5. Comparison of Corporate Governance Guidelines of different Countries 
5.1 Board of Directors 
Subject  BANGLADESH INDIA SRI LANKA PAKISTAN 
The 
Composition 
of  Board 
Representing 
various categories 
of shareholders and 
independent 
directors. 
Optimum 
combination of 
executive and non-
executive directors at 
least one woman 
director 
Balance of executive 
and non- executive 
directors (including 
independent non-
executives) 
Effective 
representation of 
independent non-
executive directors, 
including those 
representing minority 
interests. 
Board size 5 to 20 Not specifically 
covered 
Not specifically 
covered 
Not specifically 
covered 
Maximum no 
of committee 
act as member 
Not specifically 
covered 
Not more than 10 
committees across all 
companies in which 
he is a director 
Not specifically 
covered 
Not specifically 
covered 
Role of Board Covered Covered Covered Covered 
Maximum no 
of committee 
act as 
Chairman 
Not specifically 
covered 
Not more than 5 
committees across all 
companies in which 
he is a director 
Not specifically 
covered 
Not specifically 
covered 
No. of 
meeting in a 
year and the 
time interval 
between two 
meeting 
Not specifically 
covered 
At least 4 times a 
year, with a 
maximum time gap 
of 120 days between 
any two meetings. 
At least once in every 
quarter of a financial 
year 
At least once in every 
quarter of a financial 
year 
Evaluation of 
BOD as a 
whole 
Not specifically 
covered 
Covered Covered  Covered  
Evaluation of 
CEO 
Not specifically 
covered 
Covered Covered Covered 
Training of 
BOD 
Not specifically 
covered 
Covered  Covered  Covered 
Committee of 
BOD 
Audit Committee  Audit, 
Remuneration, and 
Nomination 
Committees 
Audit, Remuneration 
and Nomination 
Committees 
Audit, 
Human Resource and 
Remuneration 
(HR&R) Committee 
Code of 
Conduct 
Covered Covered Covered  Covered 
Disclosure of 
Remuneration 
Covered Covered Covered  Covered 
The Number 
of 
Independent 
Directors 
At least 1/10th of 
the total number of 
directors or 
minimum one. 
at least 1/3th  of the 
board if executive 
chairman, at least 
1/2th  of the board if 
executive chairman 
At least 02 Non-
Executive Directors 
or 1/3th    of the total 
number of Directors, 
whichever is higher. 
If Chairman and CEO 
is the same person, 
comprise a majority 
of the Board. 
At least 01 and 
preferably 1/3th  of the 
total members  
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Subject  BANGLADESH INDIA SRI LANKA PAKISTAN 
Limit on the 
number of 
independent 
directorships 
Not more than 3 
listed companies 
Not more than 7 but 
if whole time director 
in any listed 
company as an 
independent director 
in not more than 
three listed 
companies.  
Not specifically 
covered 
Not specifically 
covered 
Shareholding 
of 
independent 
director 
Not more than  1% Not more than  2% Not more than  5% Not more than 10% 
Maximum 
tenure of 
Independent 
Directors 
3 years,   extended 
for 1 term only 
As per law 9 years Three consecutive 
terms 
Appointment 
to 
Independent 
Directors 
Board of Directors As per law Nomination 
Committee 
Not specifically 
covered 
Performance 
evaluation of 
Independent 
Directors 
Not specifically 
covered 
Covered  Covered  Not specifically 
covered 
Separate 
meetings of 
the 
Independent 
Directors 
Not specifically 
covered 
At least one meeting 
in a year 
At least once each 
year 
Not specifically 
covered 
Restriction to 
be 
independent 
director 
Sponsor, loan 
defaulter, stock 
exchange member 
Pecuniary  
relationship with the 
company  or 
subsidiary  or 
supplier  
Material relationship 
or close family 
member or significant 
shareholdings 
Connection or family 
relationship with the 
company 
 
5.2 Audit Committee (AC), Remuneration Committee (RC) and Nomination Committee (NC) 
Subject  BANGLADESH INDIA SRI LANKA PAKISTAN 
Size of AC Minimum 03 Minimum 03 Minimum 02 Minimum 03 
Chairman of AC An independent 
director 
independent director Non- 
Executive 
Director 
Preferably be an 
independent 
director, 
Non-executive 
and/or 
Independent 
director under AC 
At least 1 
independent 
director 
Two-thirds of members of 
independent directors. 
Majority All non-executive 
directors and at 
least one 
independent 
director. 
Reporting 
framework of the 
AC 
Board of Directors Board of Directors Board of 
Directors 
Board of Directors 
The frequency of 
meeting of AC & 
time gap between 
two meetings 
Not covered At least 04 times in a year 
and not more than 04 
months gap between two 
meetings. 
Not 
specifically 
covered  
At least once every 
quarter of the 
financial year 
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Subject  BANGLADESH INDIA SRI LANKA PAKISTAN 
Quorum of AC 
Meeting 
At least 01 
independent 
member 
Either 02 members or one-
third of the members of the 
audit committee 
whichever is greater, but 
the minimum of 02 
independent members 
Not 
specifically 
covered 
Not specifically 
covered 
Size of RC Not covered  At least 03 directors Minimum 02 Minimum 03 
Non-executive 
and/or 
Independent 
director under RC 
Not covered  All of whom non-
executive directors and at 
least half independent. 
Exclusively of 
Non-Executive 
Directors 
Majority of non-
executive directors 
and preferably an 
independent 
director 
Chairman of RC Not covered  An independent director An 
independent 
Non-Executive 
Director 
Any member of RC 
except  CEO 
Size of NC Not covered  Minimum 03 Minimum 02 Not covered 
Chairman of NC Not covered  An independent director Non-Executive 
Director 
Not covered 
Non-executive 
and/or 
Independent 
director under NC 
Not covered  All of whom non-
executive directors and at 
least half independent. 
Majority Not covered 
 
5.3 Right of Shareholders, Disclosure, and others: 
Subject  BANGLADESH INDIA SRI LANKA Pakistan 
Participation in the decision 
regarding fundamental corporate 
change  
Not specifically 
covered 
Covered Covered Not specifically 
covered 
Voting right Not specifically 
covered 
Covered Covered Covered 
Asking the question in AGM Not specifically 
covered 
Covered Covered Covered 
Protection regarding whistleblower Not specifically 
covered 
Covered Not specifically 
covered 
Covered 
Employee Participation  Not specifically 
covered 
Covered Covered Covered 
Obtaining Certificate of Compliance 
Status 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disclosure to significant material 
change 
Covered Covered Covered Covered 
Disclosure related to Internal Control  Covered Covered Covered Covered 
Disclosure related to Related Party 
Transaction  
Covered Covered Covered Covered 
 
6. Findings: 
After comparing the CG code of Bangladesh with other countries in the SAARC region, the major findings of the 
CG code of our country are the following: 
Firstly,    our code has specifically mentioned the range of board size, the role of the BOD is mentioned but 
there is no restriction regarding maximum no. of committee act as Chairman and member of the board of directors. 
Secondly, the number of the meeting of BOD is not specially mentioned but disclosure of remuneration of 
BOD is covered. 
Thirdly, our code does not cover evaluation criteria and the matrix of BOD, CEO and Independent director 
& not mention how they are trained up. 
Fourthly, the specification of the minimum number of independent directors, restriction of the number of 
companies acting as independent director & shareholding are comparatively better in our code. 
Fifthly, maximum tenure of Independent Directors & restriction to be the independent director are well 
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defined but the separate meeting of the Independent Directors is not covered. 
Sixthly,   Size, Chairman, the inclusion of Independent director, reporting framework of the Audit Committee 
are specially identified but there is no existence of Nomination Committee and Remuneration Committee. 
Seventhly,   Not only participation in the decision regarding the fundamental corporate change, voting right 
and asking the question in AGM by Shareholders but also protections regarding whistleblower are not specially 
covered. 
Eighthly,   Employee participation is not mentioned in our code but there is the existence of disclosure 
regarding the significant material change, internal control, and related party transaction and 
Finally, our code specifies that the listed company must obtain a certificate of compliance certificate from a 
practicing Professional Accountant/Secretary (Chartered Accountant/Cost and Management 
Accountant/Chartered Secretary) and must disclose the same in the annual report but it shows only tick box format 
compliance or noncompliance.   
 
7. Recommendations: 
CG is the system by which companies are directed, managed and encouraged to maximize the value of the company 
and provide accountability, responsibility, fairness, and transparency.  We recommend necessary modifications 
and/or inclusion in the guidelines taking into account the global best practices and the practices of the neighboring 
country. Among others, we highlight the following: 
Firstly,   There should be imposed a restriction regarding maximum no of committee act as Chairman and 
Member of the board of directors. 
Secondly, BOD should meet regularly i.e at least once in every quarter of the financial year, with mentioning 
a maximum time gap of between any two meetings. 
Thirdly, the board is accountable to the shareholders and/or stakeholders of the Company. To meet this 
objective, The Board should be required, at least annually, to assess the performance of itself, the CEO and 
independent directors. 
Fourthly, the code should include the training program to its BOD on their induction as well as on a 
continuous basis. The program should include nature of its business, including its overall objectives, critical 
success factors, risk profile, internal controls system and governance structures, the responsibilities of the board, 
board committees and management and their relationship with each other, ethics and compliance framework of 
the company and about laws & regulations affecting the company & its environment. 
Fifthly, Majority member of BOD should be independent instead of t least 1/5th of the total number of 
directors. 
Sixthly,   There should be included the scope of independent directors separate meetings without the presence 
of non- independent directors and members of management. 
Seventhly, Independent Directors should be provided with adequate resources and support by the companies 
to enable them to study and analyze various information and data provided by the company management. 
Eighthly,   the code should be included nomination committee and remuneration committee specifying 
composition, powers, functions, and responsibilities.  
Ninthly, the member of the audit committee should meet regularly i.e at least once in every quarter of the 
financial year, by mentioning a maximum time gap between any two meetings. 
Tenth, the effective participation of shareholder regarding the decision of fundamental corporate change 
should be included. 
Eleventh, the code should encourage the shareholders to participate in annual general meetings of companies 
and exercise their voting rights and 
Finally, the code should be emphasized on the opportunity of shareholders to ask questions to the board, to 
place items on the agenda of general meetings, and to propose resolutions 
 
8. Conclusion: 
Forty-six years after independence, Bangladesh is lagging behind in establishing a sound corporate governance 
code. The inclusion of obtaining a compliance certificate from Chartered Accountant or Cost & Management 
Accountant or Chartered Secretary by Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) was a good 
initiative for better practice of corporate governance in listed companies. But it is just a template of tick box based 
on the review of compliance rather than an accountability and responsibility. The objective of our paper is to 
compare corporate governance guidelines in the SAARC region and identify the area of improvement for ensuring 
good governance. In the stages of development of a country, establishing a sound governance system is one of the 
most challenging areas. Strength areas of our CG code are the specification of board size, restriction of no of 
independent directorship, the shareholding of independent directors, and the quorum of the audit committee. But 
the major weakness areas are the non-specification of no of committee act as member and Chairman by one person; 
lack of training of BOD; lack of evaluation of BOD, CEO and Independent directors; non-inclusion of employee 
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participation, whistleblower policy, voting right, Remuneration and Nomination Committee. The limitation of our 
study is comparison limited to SAARC only. Further research could include a comparative study of corporate 
governance code between developed countries and developing countries. 
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